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Suppose ﬁrms are subject to decreasing returns and permanent idiosyncratic productivity shocks.
Suppose also ﬁrms can only stay in business by continuously paying a ﬁxed cost. New ﬁrms can
enter. Firms with a history of relatively good productivity shocks tend to survive and others are
forced to exit. This paper identiﬁes assumptions about entry that guarantee a stationary ﬁrm size
distribution and lead to balanced growth. The range of technology diﬀusion mechanisms that can be
considered is greatly expanded relative to previous work. High entry costs slow down the selection
process and imply slow aggregate growth. They also push the ﬁrm size distribution in the direction
of Zipf’s law.
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Reserve System.1. Iqwurgxfwlrq
This paper describes a competitive economy in which aggregate productivity growth is
endogenous and driven by ﬁrm-level experimentation, selection, and imitation by new
entrants. The structure of the economy combines elements of Luttmer [2007, 2010],
who in turn builds on an extensive literature on size distributions.1 The assumption of
perfectly competitive markets is a simplifying assumption that shuts down idiosyncratic
ﬁrm product demand as a source of heterogeneity. The focus is instead on highlighting
the types of assumptions about entry that can ensure the existence of a stationary
ﬁrm size distribution and a balanced growth path when the process of individual ﬁrm
productivity growth is highly non-stationary.
There are two ingredients. First, there is a mechanism by which new entrants can
beneﬁt from the successes of incumbent ﬁrms.2 The assumption here is that entering
ﬁrms can improve on the technology used by ﬁrms at the very low end of the incumbent
productivity distribution. Firms can become really productive only through stochastic
post-entry improvements in productivity. Second, as in Luttmer [2010], the supply of
new ﬁrms created by entrepreneurs is not perfectly elastic with respect to the market
value of new ﬁrms. This ensures that the growth rate of the economy and the num-
ber of ﬁrms are jointly determined by an entry condition and a labor market clearing
condition. This forces average ﬁrm demand for labor to be ﬁnite at the equilibrium
growth rate. This is typically not guaranteed if a zero-proﬁt entry condition by itself is
suﬃcient to compute the equilibrium growth rate of the economy. In such an economy,
a balanced growth path may fail to exist even if a stationary ﬁrm size distribution can
be constructed.
The employment size distribution of US ﬁr m si sq u i t es t a b l eo v e rt i m e .P a r a m e t r i c
approximations of this distribution (in most studies, a Pareto or Fréchet distribution,
or something very similar) are very close to implying an inﬁnite mean. With the tech-
nology diﬀusion and entry assumptions just described, this happens naturally whenever
t h ei n i t i a lt e c h n o l o g ya v a i l a b l et oe n t r a n t si ss u ﬃciently unproductive or entry is suﬃ-
ciently costly. Without the equilibrating forces implied by these assumptions, otherwise
arbitrary restrictions on ﬁrm and aggregate growth would be needed to account for this
phenomenon.
1Classic models of the ﬁrm size distribution are Simon and Bonini [1958], Steindl [1965], Lucas
[1978]. Gabaix [1999] gives an interpretation of Zipf’s Law for cities.
2The mechanism will be an externality in this paper, but it does not have to be. See Boldrin and
Levine [2002, 2009].
1This paper emphasizes the combination of trial and error and selection as an im-
portant driving force of aggregate growth. The focus is on the role of selection at the
level of populations of ﬁrms or organizations. Alchian [1950] argued for the importance
of trial and error, imitation, and selection in understanding the behavior of producers.
Nelson and Winter [1982] describe models of growth based on selection. The classic
paper on selection at the industry level is Jovanovic [1982]. His ﬁrms learn about a ﬁxed
productivity parameter, and those who learn they are productive remain in the industry,
while those who learn they are not will exit. Selection is a transitory phenomenon. Here
ﬁrms are subject to new shocks all the time, resulting in perpetual selection and growth.
Consumers and incumbent ﬁrms are introduced in Sections 2 and 3. The key technical
material about stationary size distributions is contained in Section 3.1. It is more explicit
about entry than previous treatments. Section 4 shows that an economy in which entry
productivity is exogenous may not have a balanced growth path. Section 5 does the
same for an economy with endogenous technological progress and entry decisions that
are perfectly elastic with respect to ﬁrm value. Section 6 provides a simple remedy.
Section 7 presents a calibration and Section 8 concludes.
2. Crqvxphuv
The population of consumers is Ht = Heηt and everyone has one unit of labor. Popu-
lation growth is non-negative. There is one consumption good at all times. Dynastic





T h es u b j e c t i v ed i s c o u n tr a t eρ may depend on η. The use of logarithmic utility here is
mostly for simplicity. More general homothetic preferences can be considered.
Everyone is a price taker and subject to a standard dynastic present-value budget
constraint. Throughout, the focus will be on balanced growth. Along a balanced growth
path, per-capita consumption and wages are
[ct,w t]=[ c,w]e
κt,
and the resulting interest rate is r = ρ+κ. It is assumed that ρ > η so that the present
value of aggregate consumption is ﬁnite.
23. Iqfxpehqw Flupv
A ﬁrm is a technology for producing consumption goods using labor that is subject to
decreasing returns to scale. Firms are the same except for a productivity index. This
productivity index changes continuously, as a result of ﬁrm-speciﬁcr a n d o ms h o c k s .
3.1 Type-z Firms
At y p e - z ﬁrm at time t can produce zlβ units of output with l units of labor, where








This behaves like a proﬁt function. Since z multiplies a production function exhibiting
decreasing returns, vt[z] is a convex function of z.L e t lt[z] and yt[z] be the optimal


























Output and labor inputs are also convex functions of z.F i x i n gt h en u m b e ro fﬁrms and
the aggregate labor supply, a mean-preserving spread of productivity will raise aggregate
output and wages in this economy.
To survive, a ﬁrm must incur a ﬂow cost of λF units of labor. Interruption of this cost
causes its productivity to permanently collapse to zero. Technology is like the volatile





























Thus st[z]=0corresponds to zero proﬁts. Clearly, employment and proﬁtability are
perfectly correlated for this technology, and thus st[z] c a nb ev i e w e da sam e a s u r eo f
both. The fact that employment, proﬁts, and output are convex functions of z makes
them convex functions of st[z] as well.
33.2 Productivity Dynamics
New ﬁrms can enter with an initial productivity given by Zt = Zeκt. The cost of entry
and the determination of Z and κ are described in later sections. Following entry, the
productivity of a particular time-t entrant evolves with age according to
Zt,a = Zt exp(θa + σZWa),
where Wa i sas t a n d a r dB r o w n i a nm o t i o nt h a ti si n d e p e n d e n ta c r o s sﬁrms. As noted,
Zt,a drops permanently to zero if the ﬁrm stops paying the ﬁxed cost. The parameters
θ and σZ > 0 are taken as exogenous throughout.
Since productivity and wages grow at the same rate κ, st[Zt] is constant over time.












E n t r a n te m p l o y m e n ta n dp r o ﬁtability are inversely related to the level of wages in the
economy. Since wtlt[z]=βyt[z],as t a t i o n a r yﬁrm employment distribution combined
with a number of ﬁr m st h a tg r o w sa tt h es a m er a t eη as aggregate employment results
in per-capita output that grows at the same rate κ as wages.
The fact that wages trend with entry productivity also implies that st[Zt−a,a] only
depends on a and not on t.T h u st h es t a t eo faﬁrm of age a is sa = st[Zt−a,a],a n dt h i s
evolves with ﬁrm age according to sa = S+[(θ−κ)a+σZWa]/(1−β). Along a balanced













sa = S + μa + σWa,
as long as the ﬁrm does not stop paying the ﬁxed cost.
3.3 Exit
Apart from static production decisions, the only choice the ﬁrm faces is whether or not
to continue. Because of (1), the value of a ﬁrm of size s c a nb ew r i t t e na swtλFV (s).
The value function V (s) is given by
V (s)=s u p
τ
E0







4where s0 = s,a n dτ is a stopping time that depends on the observed history of sa.T h e
value of the ﬁrm is ﬁnite if and only if ρ > μ + σ2/2, which says that the present value
of {E0[esa]}a≥0 discounted at the rate ρ is ﬁnite. The solution to the stopping problem


































for all s ≥ B and V (s)=0otherwise (Dixit and Pindyck [1994], Luttmer [2007]).
Observe that this value function, measured in units of labor, only depends on ρ/σ2 and
μ/σ2.
Rhpdun The exponent ξ and the value function V (·) are increasing in μ.T h e e x i t
barrier B is decreasing in μ.
Rapid ﬁrm growth lowers the exit barrier B and raises the value of a ﬁrm. The level of
productivity Xt a tw h i c he x i ta tt i m et t a k e sp l a c ec a nb ew r i t t e na s
Xt = Zte
−(1−β)(S−B). (5)
The exit level of productivity trends up with entry productivity and wages. Firms that
cannot keep up are driven out of business.
3.4 The Size Distribution
There is a continuum of ﬁrms measured by Nt at time t. Assuming that S>B , ﬁrms
can enter at s0 = S,e v o l v ea c c o r d i n gt od sa = μda + σdWa, and then exit if sa reaches
B. Without entry, there is a continuous ﬂow of ﬁr m st h a te x i ta tB,a n dt h en u m b e r
of ﬁrms declines. Suﬃciently large entry rates result in a rising number of ﬁrms. The
following gives conditions under which a stationary size distribution exists and describes
the relation between the entry rate ε and the resulting growth rate ω of the number of
ﬁrms. Along the balanced growth paths to be constructed later, the number of ﬁrms
has to grow at the same rate η as aggregate employment.3
3An example in Luttmer [2010] has balanced growth with no entry and a non-stationary size distri-
bution that spreads out forever. But in that example, there are no ﬁxed costs and all ﬁrms are equally
productive.
53.4.1 Constant Entry Rates
Suppose there is a non-negative ﬂow εNt of new ﬁrms entering at time t.C o n j e c t u r e
that there is a stationary size distribution with density f so that the number of ﬁrms
g r o w sa ts o m ec o n s t a n tr a t eω.I t c a n b e s h o w n t h a t1
2σ2Df(B) measures the ﬂow of
ﬁrms crossing the exit boundary B. The entry rate must therefore satisfy

























2 [D−f(S) − Df(B) − D+f(S)].





2 [D−f(S) − D+f(S)]. (10)
As a result of entry, f will have a kink at S.
The diﬀerential equation (7) is linear and homogeneous with constant coeﬃcients.























If α and α∗ are complex, then any real-valued linear combination of e−αs and eα∗s will
change signs indeﬁnitely on (S,∞).I f α is real and non-positive then α∗ is real and
non-negative. In that case, no linear combination of e−αs and eα∗s converges to zero as







if μ < 0, ω > 0 if μ ≥ 0.( 1 2 )
This deﬁnes a lower bound on how fast a stationary population of ﬁrms can decline.
There can be no stationary distribution with a declining population of ﬁrms if μ is
non-negative.
6AZ e r oE n t r yR a t e Without entry, the population of ﬁrms can only decline, and
thus μ must be negative for a stationary distribution to exist. At ε =0 , (10) implies









This is a well deﬁned density if and only if α > −α∗ > 0. Given that μ is negative,
this will be the case for any ω in [−(μ/σ)2/2,0). Thus there is a multiplicity of ω and
associated stationary densities f. At the boundary ω = −(μ/σ)2/2 the density (13)
becomes f(s)=α2(s − B)e−α(s−B),w i t hα = −μ/σ2. An argument given in Luttmer
[2007] indicates that this is the limiting distribution when the initial size distribution
has a compact support.4
A Positive Entry Rate With positive entry, (10) implies that f is not diﬀerentiable
at S.T h u s ( 7 ) d e ﬁnes two second-order diﬀerential equations, one on (B,S) and one
on (S,∞). Conditions for the endpoints are given in (8) and (9), except that the level













for all s ≥ B.T h i s i s a w e l l d e ﬁned density as long as α > 0, which is equivalent to
(12). Conditional on s ≥ S, the resulting distribution for es is Pareto, and α is its tail
index.
The ω and f that correspond to a particular entry rate ε > 0 can be determined by

























Only real solutions for ω can be interpreted as growth rates. Figure I shows (16) for
various μ.F o rμ < 0 the ε =0entry rate that corresponds to (13) is also indicated.
4If ﬁrms replicate themselves at a rate ε and the population of ﬁrms grows at the rate η as a result,
then the size density will satisfy (7) with ω = η − ε. This is an alternative interpretation for (13), and
the stability argument gives η = ε − (μ/σ)2/2.
7T h er i g h t - h a n ds i d eo f( 1 6 )i ss t r i c t l yi n c r e a s i n gi nω and approaches ω from above
for large ω.E x i t a t B becomes negligible if ω is large. If μ is non-negative, then the
right-hand side of (16) starts at 0 when ω =0 . Thus a positive entry rate implies positive
growth rate ω, and it is unique. If μ is negative, then the right-hand side of (16) attains
a positive minimum when ω < 0 reaches the lower bound (12). The entry rate has to
be large enough. If it is, there is a unique ω, and this growth rate turns positive when





 μ < 0
μ = 0 
 μ > 0
(S−B)/(−μ) 
Fljxuh I Entry and Growth of the Number of Firms
Conversely, given a growth rate ω a n da na s s o c i a t e ds t a t i o n a r yd e n s i t yf,o n ec a ns i m p l y
compute ε from (6). The conditions for existence of a stationary density f given ω can
be summarized as follows.
Pursrvlwlrq 1 Assume S>B .I fω satisﬁes (12) then there is a stationary density f
for which the number of ﬁrms grows at the rate ω. The associated entry rate ε is given
by (6). If ω < 0 then there are two stationary densities, one of which implies ε =0 .I f
ω ≥ 0 then the stationary density is unique.
It is possible to take a limit in (14) as S ↓ B,h o l d i n gω ﬁxed. This yields f(s)=
αe−α(s−B) for any s>B . This means that the limiting distribution of es on [B,∞) is
Pareto. The expression for the exit rate (15) implies that 1
2σ2Df(B) →∞as S ↓ B,
and hence the required amount of entry ε is inﬁnite as well. The above limiting density
8is also the density of a regulated Brownian motion on [B,∞).T h e i n ﬁnite entry rate
matches the fact that the regulator process needed to keep this Brownian motion above
B is not a diﬀerentiable function of time (see Harrison [1985]).
3.5 The Mean of es
Variable ﬁrm employment is proportional to es. Given a positive measure of ﬁrms, es
has to have a ﬁnite mean, or else aggregate employment would be inﬁnite. Since f(s)
behaves like e−αs for large s, es has a ﬁnite mean if and only if α > 1.I ft h e r ei sp o s i t i v e









a n dt h i sd i v e r g e sa sα ↓ 1.I f ω =0this simpliﬁes to (α/(α − 1)) × (eS−B − 1)/(S −
B), which is decreasing in α, and therefore increasing in μ. Calculations reported in
Appendix A show that this holds for ω  =0as well.
Lhppd 1 Holding ﬁxed B and S, the mean of es is increasing in μ.













Fljxuh II Conditions for Stationarity and a Finite Mean
The restriction α > 1 is equivalent to





9The condition (12) for stationarity and the condition for a ﬁnite mean given in (18) are
s h o w ni nF i g u r eI I .T h er i g h t - h a n ds i d eo f( 1 8 )c o r r e s p o n d st ot h er i g h t - h a n ds i d eo f
(12) at μ/σ2 = −1, but one boundary is linear in μ and the other a quadratic in μ.
Furthermore, (12) can hold with equality while (18) has to hold strictly. Thus (18) is a












for any sa >B .T h u s( 1 8 )s a y st h a tt h en u m b e ro fﬁrms must grow faster than variable
employment at incumbent ﬁrms that are not about to exit. Clearly, for given μ and σ2,
it is a condition that can be met by having the number of ﬁrms grow fast enough.
4. Eqwu| dqg Thfkqrorj| Agrswlrq
Suppose now that entry productivity Zt = Zeκt is completely exogenous. Since θ is also
exogenous, this implies that μ is an exogenous parameter.
Although anyone can access Zt,t os e tu pn e wﬁr m sd o e st a k el a b o ra n dt i m e .A p -
plying λE units of labor continuously generates a new ﬁrm following an exponentially
distributed waiting time with mean 1. Suppose the project of setting up a ﬁrm is initi-
ated at time t and leads to success at time t + τ. The cost of labor is wt+aλE per unit
of time, a ∈ [0,τ], and the value of the ﬁrm will be wt+τλFV (S) when it arrives at time
t + τ. The interest rate is r = ρ + κ and wages grow at the rate κ. The present-value
of the project is thus (λFV (S) − λE)/(1 + ρ). Since anyone can start a project, these
proﬁts cannot be positive.
Without entry, the number of ﬁrms has to decline. If the distribution of ﬁrms is
stationary, then aggregate ﬁrm employment declines as well. But we are assuming that
the population grows at a non-negative rate η and everyone has one unit of labor. This
m e a n st h e r ec a nb en ob a l a n c e dg r o w t hp a t hw i t h o u te n t r y .T h u se n t r yi sp o s i t i v e ,a n d
the proﬁts from a project to start a ﬁrm must be zero. That is,
λE = λFV (S). (19)
Since V (s) is increasing and convex, with an asymptote that behaves like es, a unique
solution for S is guaranteed. This solution varies with entry and ﬁxed costs only to the
extent that λE/λF is aﬀected.
If the number of ﬁrms Nt grows at some rate ω that satisﬁes (18), then so does the
amount of labor λEεNt required to set up new ﬁrms, as well as the amount of labor
10employed by all ﬁrms. The only way this can be part of a balanced growth path is if
ω = η. The resulting entry rate ε is then determined by (6). Recall from (1) that a ﬁrm























A balanced growth path can now be constructed as follows. The density f is deﬁned
by (11) and (14), evaluated at ω = η,a n dg i v e nB and S. The exit boundary B is
determined by (3) and the entry size S is determined by the zero-proﬁt condition (19).
The labor market clearing condition (20) then determines the number of ﬁrms. The level
of wages follows from S and its deﬁnition (2).
This construction works only as long as (18) holds for ω = η. Without this condition,
t h er i g h t - h a n ds i d eo f( 2 0 )w o u l dn o tb eﬁnite, and this is inconsistent with a positive
measure of ﬁrms.
5. Eqgrjhql}lqj Gurzwk
If (18) is violated at ω = η, there can be no balanced growth path. Condition (18)
depends on parameters that have so far all been taken as exogenous. In this section,
the growth rate κ of the entry productivity of new ﬁrms is endogenous. This makes
μ =( θ − κ)/(1 − β) endogenous and sets the stage for ﬁnding equilibrium mechanisms
that ensure the existence of a balanced growth path.5
5.1 A Spillover at the Bottom
Continue to assume that the drift of incumbent productivity is given exogenously by θ.
As before, suppose that entrepreneurs can expend a ﬂow of λE units of labor to create
new ﬁrms at a unit rate. Rather than assuming entrant productivity grows exogenously,
suppose that an entrepreneur who creates a new ﬁrm can copy the technology of ﬁrms
that are about to exit, and improve the productivity of this technology by a factor Γ1−β,
for some Γ > 1. The resulting entry productivity is
Zt = Γ
1−βXt.
As in Arrow [1962], this introduces a knowledge spillover. In contrast to the quality-
ladder model of Grossman and Helpman [1991], new ﬁr m sh e r ed on o te n t e ra tt h et o p
5See Atkeson and Burstein [2007] for a related economy in which θ is endogenous.
11of a productivity ladder, ahead of everyone else. Instead, assuming Γ is relatively close
to 1, entrants only get to skip the bottom few rungs, occupied by ﬁrms that are about
to exit. From there they have to climb the productivity ladder, by trial and error.6














Fljxuh III Existence of a Balanced Growth Path
Recall from (5) that Xt/Zt = e−(1−β)(S−B), and hence
S = B +l n ( Γ). (21)
The zero-proﬁt condition for entrepreneurs is still λE = λFV (S). Combining this with












This is a function of ξ, which in turn is a function only of κ,v i aμ =( θ−κ)/(1−β).T h u s
the requirement that entrepreneurs make zero proﬁts implies an equilibrium condition
that depends only on the balanced growth rate κ.
The right-hand side of (22) approaches 0 from above as ξ ↓ 0.I ti si n c r e a s i n gi nξ,
with a large-ξ asymptote equal to (Γ−1)λF/ρ. The size of the productivity improvement
6For alternative models of spillovers with productivity distributions, see Kortum [1997], Eaton and
Kortum [1999], Luttmer [2007], Lucas [2008], and Alvarez, Buera and Lucas [2008].
12entrants can make puts an upper bound on the value of a new ﬁrm. Thus (22) will have







and this solution is unique. Entry costs cannot be too high, or the improvements avail-
able to entrants over the ﬁrms that are just exiting cannot be too small. In particular,
t a k i n gal i m i ta n dl e t t i n gΓ ↓ 1 so that S ↓ B is guaranteed to rule out a solution to
(22) unless entry costs also go to zero.
Although μ is now an equilibrium variable, nothing about the equilibrium condition
(22) guarantees that (18) holds at ω = η.S o l v i n g t h e d e ﬁnition (3) of ξ for μ and







2ξ(1 + ξ) − ρ
 
< η. (23)
Figure III shows the left-hand side of (23) as a function of ξ,t o g e t h e rw i t hρ/λF times
the right-hand side of the zero-proﬁt condition (22), for Γ =2 , σ = .2 and ρ = .02.I f
η = .01 then ξ cannot be much above .78, and hence ρλE/λF cannot be much above .2.
Slightly higher values of ρλE/λF lead to non-existence of a balanced growth path, even
though λE/λF is still much smaller than (Γ − 1)/ρ and (22) has a unique solution.
5.2 Random Imitation
One possible mechanism for ensuring that (18) holds in equilibrium is given in Luttmer
[2007]. There, entrants at time t do not start with a common Zt = Γ1−βXt,b u tw i t h
idiosyncratic δ
1−βz,w h e r et h ez are random draws from the population of incumbent
producers. The fact that entrepreneurs draw at random from the time-t population
means that their incentives to enter are driven by the population average of V (st[z]).
Since V (st[z]) behaves like est[z], this population average will explode precisely when
μ + σ2/2 approaches η from below. Imposing the zero-proﬁt condition therefore forces
the equilibrium growth rate to be such that the mean of es is ﬁnite, which corresponds
to condition (18). Given this, the right-hand side of (20) is ﬁnite, and one can use this
condition to solve for the number of ﬁrms N.7
This captures the intuition that the presence of large and proﬁtable ﬁrms should
induce entry and reduce the growth rate of incumbent ﬁrms. Note also that even though
7If δ =0 , the size distributions consistent with balanced growth are the ones deﬁned in (13). There is
entry, not at a point S, but throughout (B,∞), with an intensity that is proportional to the incumbent
size density.
13potential entrants are drawing incumbents randomly, actual entry is selective if δ < 1:
all random draws at time t satisfy z>X t, but only those potential entrants for whom
δ
1−βz>X t actually enter. A diﬃculty with this mechanism is that δ
1−βz will still be
very large for some fraction of the entrants, even if the parameter δ is set far below
1 so that the ability of entrants to imitate is very poor. In the data, almost without
exception, new ﬁrms are very small.
6. Lhvv-Tkdq-Phuihfwo| Eodvwlf Eqwu|
In the economies described so far, the zero-proﬁt condition for entrepreneurs is λE =
λFV (S) and V (·) depends on μ. With exogenous technological progress, μ is exogenous
and the zero-proﬁt condition determines S. In the spillover economy, S = B +l n ( Γ)
and the zero-proﬁt condition pins down μ, and hence the growth rate κ = θ − (1 − β)μ
of the economy. But it does so without reference to the labor-market clearing condition
(20). A balanced growth path may then not exist because there is no guarantee that
μ + σ2/2 < η.
In a setting of exogenous aggregate growth but endogenous ﬁrm growth, Luttmer
[2010] avoids this problem by using a Roy model of occupational choice to make the
entry of new ﬁrms less than perfectly elastic with respect to the market value of new
ﬁrms. As a result, the number of ﬁrms and their growth rate are jointly determined
by an entry condition and a labor market clearing condition. This forces average ﬁrm
labor demand to be ﬁnite. This device can also be used here, with endogenous aggregate
growth and exogenous growth of incumbent ﬁrms.
6.1 Workers and Entrepreneurs
Suppose that agents in the economy vary in their skills in supplying labor and creating
new ﬁrms. Speciﬁcally, suppose a type-(x,y) agent can supply x units of labor or create
new ﬁrms at a Poisson rate y. The distribution of talent in the population is described
by some distribution function T(x,y). Comparative advantage determines occupational
choice. Wages are wt per unit of labor and, along a balanced growth path, the value of
an e wﬁrm is wtλFV (S). In units of labor, this equals
q = λFV (S).
At y p e - (x,y) agent will choose to be a worker if qy < x a n da ne n t r e p r e n e u ri fqy > x.











Suppose that T is continuous with a ﬁnite mean and full support in R2
++. This implies
that the supplies of labor and new ﬁrms are positive and vary continuously with q.
Clearly, L(q) is a decreasing function and E(q) an increasing function. As q goes to zero,
E(q) goes to zero while L(q) converges to the mean endowment of labor. On the other
hand, if q becomes large, then the per-capita labor supply goes to zero while the supply
of new ﬁrms grows to the mean of ability to create new ﬁrms. Hence L(q)/E(q) →∞
as q → 0 and L(q)/E(q) → 0 as q →∞ . Thus the relative supplies of labor and new
ﬁrms vary inversely with q and range throughout (0,∞).T h e r a t i o L(q)/E(q) will be
proportional to a negative power of q if labor and entrepreneurial skills are given by two
independent Fréchet distributions.
6.2 Balanced Growth
Along a balanced growth path, the de-trended supply of new ﬁrms is E(q)H = εN,a n d
this supply must sustain a number of ﬁr m st h a tg r o w sa tt h er a t eη. Accounting for exit








Labor is now used only by incumbent ﬁrms, and hence the labor market clearing condi-













New ﬁrms enter with a productivity that implies S = B +l n ( Γ),a si n( 2 1 ) .C o m b i n i n g












The parameter ξ and the exit barrier B are a functions only of μ,d e ﬁned in (3). Hence
q is a function only of μ. Because of S = B +l n ( Γ), the stationary density f,d e ﬁned
in (14), also depends only on μ. Using (3), (14) and S = B +l n ( Γ), the equilibrium
conditions (24)-(26) therefore jointly determine the value of a new ﬁrm q,t h en u m b e ro f
ﬁrms N,a n dt h ee m p l o y m e n tg r o w t hr a t eμ+σ2/2 of incumbent ﬁrms. From there the
15rest of the balanced growth path follows. If there is a solution to (24)-(26), then (25)


















Fljxuh IV The Supply and Demand for Firms
One can view (24) and (25) as, respectively, the balanced growth supply and demand
of ﬁrms. The supply depends on the entrepreneurial supply of new ﬁrms and the rate
at which new ﬁrms need to be created to ensure the number of ﬁrms grows at the rate
η. The demand for ﬁrms depends on the supply of labor and the size of the average
ﬁrm. Both supply and demand depend directly on the price of new ﬁrms, through the
occupational choices made by agents, and also indirectly: via μ, the price of a new ﬁrm
depends the growth rate of the economy, and this growth rate determines the exit rate
and average ﬁrm demand for labor.
6.2.1 Existence and Uniqueness
A balanced growth path exists and is unique if the demand and supply of ﬁrms intersect
uniquely. The following lemma collects some key derivatives that can be used to show
that this is indeed the case.

















16when ω = η and the entry condition S = B +l n ( Γ) holds.
More rapid ﬁrm growth implies a lower exit barrier B and a higher value q for new ﬁrms
that enter with S = B +l n ( Γ).T h ee ﬀect on B follows immediately from (3), and the
eﬀect on q from (3) and (26). Evaluating the entry rate (6) at ω = η and using (15) and
S = B +l n ( Γ) gives ε = η + 1
2σ2Df(B)=η/(1 − Γ−α∗), and this is easily seen to be
decreasing in μ when Γ > 1. Rapidly growing ﬁrms are less likely to exit and so it takes
less entry to maintain a growing population of ﬁrms. As shown in Lemma 1, holding
ﬁxed B and S,t h em e a no fes is increasing in μ. But here B declines and S−B =l n ( Γ),
which tends to lower the mean of es. It is shown in Appendix B that the eﬀect described
in Lemma 1 dominates.
The supply of ﬁrms (24) is increasing in μ,s i n c eE(q) is an increasing function, q is
increasing in μ, and the entry rate ε = η + 1
2σ2Df(B) is decreasing in μ.F u r t h e r m o r e ,
letting μ →− ∞will cause q to approach 0 and ε = η/(1−Γ−α∗) to approach ∞.T h u s
the supply of ﬁrms can be made arbitrarily close to 0 by taking μ suﬃciently small.
The demand for ﬁrms (25) is decreasing in μ,s i n c eL(q) is a decreasing function, q
is increasing in μ,a n dt h em e a nﬁrm size is increasing in μ. In addition, letting μ+ 1
2σ2
approach the upper bound η < ρ will cause the mean ﬁrm size to diverge, while q remains
well deﬁned (the value of a ﬁrm only diverges when μ+ 1
2σ2 reaches ρ)a n dL(q) remains
bounded. Thus the demand for ﬁrms will shrink to zero for μ + 1
2σ2 close to η.
Pursrvlwlrq 2 T h e r ei sau n i q u ee q u i l i b r i u mg r o w t hr a t eκ = θ − (1 − β)μ.
The demand and supply of ﬁrms are shown in Figure IV as a function of q,w h i c hi sa
monotone function of μimplied by (3) and (26). The second panel of Figure IV shows
the relation between the tail index α and the price q of new ﬁrms.
6.2.2 Incumbent and Entrant Innovation
The incumbent productivity growth rate θ only appears in the expression κ = θ−(1−β)μ.
Changes in the growth rate of incumbent productivity therefore translate one-for-one
into changes in the growth rate of aggregate productivity. They leave no mark on the
underlying distribution of productivity, the resulting size distribution of ﬁrms, entry and
exit rates, or the market value of new and existing ﬁrms.
Changes in the distribution of skills in this economy do give rise to shifts in the
demand and supply curves in Figure IV. This typically has growth eﬀects, not just level
eﬀects. An increase in the supply of entrepreneurial eﬀort lowers q, which increases α
17and lowers μ, leading to an increase the growth rate κ of aggregate productivity. More
entrepreneurial eﬀo r ta tag i v e nq implies a size distribution with a thinner tail and a
higher growth rate of aggregate productivity. The tail index of the size distribution will
be close to the α =1asymptote if entrepreneurial talent suﬃciently scarce.
To study the eﬀects of an increase in the step Γ by which entrepreneurs can improve
the technology of exiting producers, eliminate q from (24) and (25) using (26), to obtain
a supply of ﬁrms that is increasing in μ and a demand for ﬁrms that is decreasing in μ,













given the entry condition S = B+ln(Γ). The fact that the value of new ﬁrms rises with
Γ is immediate from (26). The entry rate ε = η/(1−Γ−α∗) is clearly decreasing in Γ.A
higher Γ means that new ﬁrms enter farther away from the exit barrier and thus survive
longer. It then requires less entry to maintain a growing population of ﬁrms. The fact
that the mean size is increasing in Γ follows from (17) evaluated at S−B =l n ( Γ).W i t h
this, one can use (25)-(26) to argue that an increase in Γ causes the supply of ﬁrms to
rise and the demand for ﬁrms to fall, for given μ. It follows that μ must fall. An increase
in Γ makes new ﬁrms more valuable, causing agents to substitute from supplying labor
(demanding ﬁrms) to supplying entrepreneurial eﬀort (supplying ﬁrms), and the eﬀects
on the supply and demand for ﬁrms are magniﬁed by the fact that less entry is required
and ﬁrms will be larger. Equilibrium can only be restored with a decline in μ, and hence
ar i s ei nt h eg r o w t hr a t eκ of aggregate productivity. In this economy, making it easier
for entrants to make productivity improvements relative to exiting ﬁrms causes growth
to accelerate.
In the data, α > 1 is close to 1. This can be interpreted to mean that entrants can
make only small productivity improvements over exiting ﬁrms.
Cruroodu| The tail index α > 1 converges to 1,Z i p f ’ sL a w ,a sΓ > 1 converges to 1.
To see this, ﬁrst note that the supply of ﬁrms at any given μ converges to zero as Γ ↓ 1,
for two reasons. By (26), q goes to zero as Γ ↓ 1 and holding ﬁxed μ. This means that
the supply of entrepreneurial eﬀort goes to zero. In addition, the entry rate η/(1−Γ−α∗)
explodes as Γ approaches 1 from above. To examine the limiting demand for ﬁrms,
note from (17) that the mean of es−B converges to α/(α − 1) as Γ ↓ 1, for any given
μ+σ2/2 < η.S i n c eq goes to zero, the supply of labor converges to its maximum. In the
limit, the demand for ﬁr m s( 2 5 )b e c o m e saf u n c t i o no fμ only via the eﬀect of μ on the
18average ﬁrm size. Since the mean of es−B diverges as α ↓ 1, this limiting demand curve
still has the property that N/H ↓ 0 as μ + σ2/2 ↑ η. It follows that the intersection of
the supply and demand curves must occur at a μ + σ2/2 ↑ η as the supply converges to
zero because of Γ ↓ 1.
6.2.3 Comparison with Perfectly Elastic Entry
In terms of μ, the structure of the equilibrium conditions (24)-(26) is
E(q)=G1(μ)N/H, L(q)=G2(μ)N/H, q = G3(μ),
where G1(μ) is the required entry rate, G2(μ) is the average ﬁrm demand for labor,
and G3(μ) is the value of a new ﬁrm. By condition (18), G2(μ) is ﬁnite if and only if
μ + σ2/2 < η. With less-than-perfectly-elastic entry, E(q) and L(q) vary continuously
and Proposition 2 shows that a unique solution is guaranteed. With perfectly elastic
entry, the pair [E(q),L(q)] equals [0,1] if λE >qand [1/λE,0] if λE <q .T h i sm e a n st h a t
λE = q = G3(μ) is the only candidate equilibrium. But G2(μ) may not be ﬁnite at the
implied μ, and in that case there will be no balanced growth path. The random imitation
process in Luttmer [2007] implies that G2(μ) if ﬁnite whenever G3(μ) is, ensuring the
existence of a balanced growth path.
7. AC doleudwlrq
US Census data compiled by the Small Business Administration show that the employ-
ment size distribution of employer ﬁrms is stable over time and close to Pareto for ﬁrms
with more than about 20 employees. A point estimate of the tail index α is about 1.06.
There is some uncertainty about this estimate. A value of 1.1 could work too, but larger
values of α are hard to reconcile with the observed number of large ﬁrms. The total
number of ﬁrms grows at roughly the US population growth rate of around 1%, although
there are some ﬂuctuations. Entry of new ﬁrms is at a stable rate of about 11% per an-
num. Employment among ﬁrms with 500 or more employees grows at an annual rate of
around .36% over the period 1988-2006, although this number is not precisely estimated
(serially uncorrelated measurement or approximation error implies a standard error of
about .38%.) Consistent with the class of models considered here, not many of these
ﬁrms exit over the course of a year.8
8The number is about 2.5%, higher than one might expect if ﬁrms only exit at B. No doubt some
of these exits are due to takeovers and mergers.












2(α − 1). (27)
Over small periods of time, the left-hand side is the growth rate of employment at
incumbent ﬁrms. A tail index close to 1 implies that this growth rate will be close to
η, but the discrepancy will be larger the larger the variance of productivity shocks. If
t h ee m p l o y m e n tg r o w t hr a t eo f.36% per annum at ﬁr m sw i t hm o r et h a n5 0 0e m p l o y e e s
is used to infer μ + σ2/2,t h e n( 2 7 )y i e l d sσ = .44. Davis et al. [2006] report estimates
of the annual standard deviation of ﬁrm employment growth that range widely, roughly
from 15% to 65%, depending on whether a ﬁrm is publicly traded or not, and on the
sample period. Their most recent estimate for the whole economy is about 37%.
Recall that the entry rate is ε = η/(1 − Γ−α∗) a n dn o t et h a t( 1 1 )i m p l i e sαα∗ =













.( 2 8 )
Thus ln(Γ) is proportional to σ2/2,w i t hac o e ﬃcient that can be inferred from the tail
index α ≈ 1.06, the population growth rate η ≈ .01, and the entry rate ε ≈ .11.T h e
resulting coeﬃcient is 10.1, and then σ ≈ .44 implies ln(Γ) ≈ .98. Hence, variable
employment at entering ﬁrms is about 2.7 t i m e sv a r i a b l ee m p l o y m e n ta te x i t i n gﬁrms.
The implicit diﬀerence in productivity will be much smaller if β is close to 1 (there is no
physical capital in this economy.) At β = .9, entrants have a productivity advantage over
exiting ﬁrms of about 10%, and the standard deviation σZ of incumbent productivity
growth is about 4.4% per annum.
The ﬁrst and second panel of Figure V show the incumbent employment growth rate
(27) and the spillover parameter (28) as functions of σ.I n c l u d e di nt h eﬁrst panel is a
further decomposition of the growth rate η of aggregate employment,
η =
εeS − (ε − η)eB
  ∞
B esf(s)ds







      
incumbents
.
This can be veriﬁed mechanically using (11) and (17). The ﬁrst term is the entry
rate times the ratio of entry employment over average employment, which accounts for
variable employment created by entry. The second term represents variable employment
lost as a result of exiting ﬁrms, and the third term is the growth rate of employment
20at incumbent ﬁrms. In SBA data, the gross employment ﬂows from entry and exit
hover around 3% of aggregate employment, which signiﬁcantly exceeds the gross ﬂows
s h o w ni nF i g u r eV .I nt h ed a t a ,t h er a t i oo fe n t r ya n de x i te m p l o y m e n to v e ra g g r e g a t e
employment is higher than implied by σ in the range reported here. One likely reason




B es−Bf(s)ds are very sensitive to small changes
in the tail index α near its asymptote α =1 . Another is heterogeneity in the exit and
entry points B and S.

























Contribution to 1% Employment Growth









Consumption Growth and Entry/Exit Employment
100 × κ





Fljxuh V Growth Decomposition and Implied Spillover
The second panel of Figure V also shows the implied growth rate of per-capita con-
sumption κ = θ +( 1− β)(1
2σ2α − η/α) at β = .9. The Cobb-Douglas technology used
by all ﬁr m si m p l i e st h a taﬁrm with productivity z produces yt[z]=wtlt[z]/β units of
consumption. The contributions of incumbent ﬁrms to aggregate consumption growth
can therefore be calculated by simply adding the κ shown in the second panel to the
μ+σ2/2 s h o w ni nt h eﬁrst panel. The result is κ+μ+σ2/2=θ+βη/α+(1− αβ)σ2/2.
Thus the implied contribution of incumbent ﬁrms to aggregate consumption growth is
linear and increasing in σ2,w i t has m a l ls l o p ew h e nβ is close to 1.
At σ = .44, an incumbent employment growth rate of .36% implies μ ≈− .0932.
Thus, according to these estimates, the positive incumbent employment growth rate is
the combination of a strong negative drift in incumbent employment, and a lot of re-
allocation of employment driven by productivity shocks. This means that κ = θ +( 1−
21β) × .0932, and hence randomness and re-allocation add almost 1% to the logarithmic
drift θ of incumbent productivity growth if β = .9, or about half the 2% growth rate of
US per-capita consumption. This is consistent with the important role for re-allocation
found in Restuccia and Rogerson [2008] and Hsieh and Klenow [2009].
8. Crqfoxglqj Rhpdunv
Clearly, the assumption that entering ﬁrms are small only because their technology is
relatively close to that of the small ﬁr m st h a ta r ea b o u tt oe x i ti sd i ﬃcult to maintain.
So is the assumption, Gribrat’s Law, that ﬁrm growth is independent of size. Google
and Wal-Mart did not grow at comparable rates over the last decade: from 8 to 20,000
and from 1.1 million to 2.1 million employees, at respective annual rates of 78% and
6.5%.A se m p h a s i z e di nL u t t m e r[ 2 0 1 0 ]m a n yl a r g eﬁr m sh a v eg o n et h r o u g has u s t a i n e d
period of extremely rapid growth following entry. The correct interpretation is likely
to be that these ﬁrms early on actually had a very productive technology (or at least
the building blocks for such a technology), but creating the organization to implement
this technology on a large scale took signiﬁcant resources and time. Incorporating these
elements into tractable and quantitatively plausible models of technology diﬀusion and
endogenous growth remains an important task for further research.





















where z = α∗(S−B). The deﬁnitions of α and α∗ imply that ∂α/∂μ < 0 and ∂α∗/∂μ > 0.
Thus, for ﬁxed B,t h eﬁrst factor on the right-hand side is increasing in μ.W en e e dt o
show that the second factor is increasing in z.D e ﬁne g(y)=( ey − 1)/y for any y>0.
We need to show that g(S − B + z)/g(z) is increasing in z when S>B .T h a t i s ,w e
need ∂ ln(g(S − B + z))/∂z>∂ ln(g(z))/∂z when S>B .T h i si st r u ei fDg(z)/g(z) is
















22To see that this is positive, note that ez/2−e−z/2−z is an increasing function for z>0,
and equal to 0 at z =0 . Hence ez/2 >e −z/2+z for z>0. It follows that (ez−1)/z > ez/2
for all z>0, and this proves the desired result.
BP urri ri Lhppd 2
Only the derivative of the mean of es with respect to μ remains to be shown. By Lemma
1, the second factor on the right-hand side of (29) is increasing in μ when S−B =l n ( Γ)
is ﬁxed. Write a = η/(σ2/2), b = ρ/(σ2/2) and recall that b>a>0.A l s o w r i t e
x = μ/σ2 and note that α > 1 corresponds to a>1+2x.U s i n gt h ed e ﬁnitions of α and
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Since b>a ,t h eq u e s t i o ni st h u si fy−(1+x)
 
x2 + y is increasing in y when y>1+2x.














This is clearly positive if 1+x ≤ 0. The derivative is also positive if 1+x>0 and
3(x2+y)+y>1+2x.T h i si st r u ew h e ny>1+2x and y>0, and hence for y ∈ {a,b}.
Rhihuhqfhv
[1] Alchian, A.A., “Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory,” Journal of Political
Economy, vol. 58, no. 3 (1950), 211-221.
[2] Alvarez, F.E., F.J. Buera, and R.E. Lucas, Jr., “Models of Idea Flows,” NBER
working paper 14135 (2008).
[3] Arrow, K.J., “The Economic Implications of Learning by Doing,” Review of Eco-
nomic Studies,v o l .2 9 ,n o .3( 1 9 6 2 ) ,1 5 5 - 1 7 3 .
23[4] Atkeson, A. and A. Burstein, “Innovation, Firm Dynamics, and International
Trade,” NBER working paper 13326 (2007).
[5] Boldrin, M. and D.K. Levine, “Factor Saving Innovation,” Journal of Economic
Theory, vol. 105 (2002), 18-41.
[6] Boldrin, M. and D.K. Levine, “Quality Ladders, Competition and Endogenous
Growth,” working paper, Washington University in St. Louis (2009).
[7] Davis, S.J., J. Haltiwanger, R. Jarmin, and J. Miranda, “Volatility and Dispersion
in Business Growth Rates: Publicly Traded Versus Privately Held Firms,” NBER
Macroeconomics Annual 2006, edited by D. Acemoglu, K. Rogoﬀ and M. Woodford,
MIT Press (2006).
[8] Eaton, J. and S. Kortum, “International Technology Diﬀusion: Theory and Mea-
surement,” International Economic Review, vol. 40, no. 3 (1999), 537-570.
[9] Gabaix, X., “Zipf’s Law for Cities: An Explanation,” Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics, vol. 114, no. 3 (1999), 739-767.
[10] Grossman, G.M. and E. Helpman, Innovation and Growth in the Global Economy,
MIT Press (1991).
[11] Harrison, J.M., Brownian Motion and Stochastic Flow Systems, Wiley (1985).
[12] Hsieh, C.-T. and P.J. Klenow, “Misallocation and Manufacturing TFP in China
and India,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 124, no. 4 (2009), 1403-1448.
[13] Jovanovic, B., “Selection and the Evolution of Industry,” Econometrica, vol. 50, no.
3 (1982), 649-670.
[14] Kortum, S., “Research, Patenting, and Technological Change,” Econometrica,v o l .
65, no. 6 (1997), 1389-1419.
[15] Lucas, R.E., Jr. “On the Size Distribution of Business Firms,” Bell Journal of
Economics, vol. 9, no. 2 (1978), 508-523.
[16] Lucas, R.E., Jr. “Ideas and Growth,” NBER working paper 14133 (2008).
[17] Luttmer, E.G.J., “Selection, Growth, and the Size Distribution of Firms,” Quarterly
Journal of Economics, vol. 122, no. 3 (2007), 1103-1144.
24[18] Luttmer, E.G.J., “On the Mechanics of Firm Growth,” Federal Reserve Bank of
Minneapolis Staﬀ Report 440 (2010).
[19] Nelson, R.N. and S.G. Winter, An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change,T h e
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press (1982).
[20] Restuccia, D. and R. Rogerson, “Policy Distortions and Aggregate Productivity
with Heterogeneous Plants,” Review of Economic Dynamics, vol. 11 (2008), 707-
720.
[21] Simon, H.A. and C.P. Bonini, “The Size Distribution of Business Firms,” American
Economic Review, vol. 48, no. 4 (1958), 607-617.
[22] Steindl, J., Random Processes and the Growth of Firms; A Study of the Pareto Law,
Hafner Publishing Company, New York, NY (1965).
25